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At the intersection of taxonomy and nomenclature lies the scientific practice of typification.  
This practice occurs in biology with the use of holotypes (type specimens), in geology with the 
use of stratotypes, and in metrology with the use of measurement prototypes.  In this paper I 
develop the first general definition of a scientific type and outline a new philosophical theory of 
types inspired by Pierre Duhem.  I use this general framework to resolve the necessity-
contingency debate about type specimens in philosophy of biology, to advance the debate over 
the myth of the absolute accuracy of standards in metrology, and to address the definition-
correlation debate in geology.  I conclude that just as there has been a productive synergy 
between philosophical accounts of natural kinds and scientific taxonomic practices, so too there 
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 When it comes to scientific taxonomy and nomenclature, the predominant philosophical 
focus has been on the issue of natural kinds.  While this focus on natural kinds has been 
philosophically productive, there is another component to some taxonomic and nomenclatural 
practices that has been largely overlooked by philosophers of science, and that is what we might 
call 'scientific types' and the practice of typification.  Scientific types appear across the sciences, 
though they are only a part of some classificatory practices.  Scientific types are found, for 
example, in biology in the context of holotypes, in the geosciences as stratotypes, and in physics 
in the form of measurement prototypes (standards).  It is worth underscoring at the outset that 
scientific types are not kinds—they are instead concrete particulars: a particular biological 
specimen, a particular section of rock, a particular hunk of machined metal.  My aim in this 
paper is to draw together these different cases, identify a common core in their characterization 
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and use, and abstract from that common core a new philosophical account of scientific types.1  I 
will do this through a detailed examination of scientific practice: examining the use of holotypes 
in biology in section 2.1, the use of stratotypes in geology in section 2.2, and the use of 
measurement prototypes in section 2.3.  In section 2.4, I will extract from these three cases a 
general characterization of scientific types and propose the following general definition: a 
scientific type is a concrete individual object that serves as a standard of reference for, and 
realization of, the definition or taxon category that it names.  I will then demonstrate the 
philosophical value of this new general conception of scientific types by using it to advance three 
debates in the philosophy of science: the necessity-contingency debate about holotypes, the 
absolute accuracy debate over measurement standards, and the definition-correlation debate 
about stratotypes.   
 One of the few contexts in which scientific types have received some philosophical 
attention is in the philosophy of biology, where there has been a flurry of papers over an apparent 
paradox concerning holotypes (e.g. Levine 2001): specifically, the debate has been over whether 
a holotype (i.e., type specimen) belongs contingently or necessarily to the species it names.  In 
section 3 I briefly review this necessity-contingency debate, arguing that it can be profitably 
advanced by placing holotypes within the broader category of scientific types that I define.   
 In section 4.1, I turn to the philosophical literature on measurement prototypes, and 
review the debate in metrology over the absolute accuracy of measurement standards.  I argue 
that what Eran Tal (2011) calls the "myth of the absolute accuracy of standards" should be 
rejected not just for measurement prototypes, but also for other scientific types.  This insight also 
provides a foundation for addressing the debate in geology over whether definition precedes or 
follows correlation (section 4.3).  I examine the conditions under which the scientific institutions 
governing the use of these scientific types (viz., the International Bureau of Weights and 
Measures, the International Commission on Zoological Nomenclature, and the International 
Commission on Stratigraphy) allow for their revision.  A common thread among these various 
provisos suggests what I call a Duhemian approach to scientific types, which I outline in the final 
section 5.  As we will see, the key insight from Duhem is his distinction between a stipulative 
"symbolic" definition and a "common sense" definition that allows him to reject the 
conventionalist argument for the "absolute accuracy" of stipulative definitions.  I will show how 
a similar move can be adapted to the context of scientific types.   
 
 
2. Scientific Types 
The terms 'type' and 'typification' arise from the scientific discourse in these subfields, and hence 
are the terms I adopt here, even though they can lead to an initial confusion in philosophical 
circles, where the term 'type' usually takes on a different—and indeed opposite—meaning.  I 
have tried to flag the technical meaning in this context by using the phrase 'scientific type.' As it 
                                                
1 The general philosophical attitude that guides my approach to scientific types is similar to a 
particular strain of philosophical work on natural kinds, namely the practice-oriented approach 
exemplified by Kendig's (2015) work on kinding (which focuses on how natural kind categories 
are identified, constructed, maintained, and even revised); and the view that natural kinds are 
neither simply a matter of discovery, nor simply a matter of conventional stipulation, but rather 
involve elements of both (e.g., LaPorte 2004, Bokulich 2014).  However, as my focus in this 
paper is on scientific types and not natural kinds, I will not discuss this literature further here.   
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is used here, a scientific type is neither synonymous with 'kind' or 'category,' nor is it to be 
contrasted with token, as in the familiar type-token distinction.  Indeed scientific types are a kind 
of token.  Although the term 'typification' is used by itself, 'type' usually appears as either a 
suffix (as in holotype, stratotype, prototype), or as an adjective (as in type specimen).  Because 
the discussion of scientific types has hitherto taken place only within one of these specific 
scientific fields, there has not yet, to my knowledge, been a general definition offered for 
scientific types more broadly.  The definition I develop here is the following: A scientific type is 
a concrete individual object that serves as an objective standard of reference for, and realization 
of, the definition or taxon category it names.  As we will see, this definition captures what is 
common among the prima facie diverse notions of holotypes, stratotypes, and measurement 
prototypes.   
 
2.1 Holotypes 
The use of holotypes is a long-standing practice in biology that is governed by the International 
Commission on Zoological Nomenclature (ICZN).  According to the ICZN's code (the 
International Code of Zoological Nomenclature), a holotype is defined as "the single specimen 
upon which a new nominal species group taxon is based in the original publication" (Article 73).  
When a new species is discovered, that specimen is described in detail in a publication and 
named, thereby leading to the recognition of a new taxonomic category.  That individual 
specimen is then designated the holotype for that species and is stored in a museum in perpetuity, 
so that it is available to subsequent researchers for comparison and consultation.  If one goes 
behind the scenes at a museum such as the Museum of Comparative Zoology at Harvard 
University, one will typically find many such holotype specimens, conventionally marked with a 
red ribbon.  Thus, in principle, for every named species known to biology, there should be 
somewhere in the world an individual marked specimen that serves as that species' holotype.   
 The specimen that is designated a holotype need not be a complete organism: it can be a 
part of an animal (such as a femur or tooth), a fossil (either a natural replacement or a natural 
impression), or even a microscope "type slide," depending on the species in question.  The idea 
behind holotypes is to ground the name of a new taxon in a concrete object that serves as an 
objective standard, though there is no requirement that the specimen in question be "typical," in 
the sense of representing an average range of variation, a particular sex, or even a particular life 
stage of a species.  Given the limitations of a single specimen holotype, additional "paratypes" 
can also be designated, for example representing a different sex or life-stage than the holotype.  
These paratypes are conventionally designated by a blue ribbon in museum collections.   
 To better understand the practice of holotypes it is helpful to highlight some key features 
of the ICZN code's principle of typification: 
The fixation of the name-bearing type of a nominal taxon provides the objective standard 
of reference for the application of the name it bears.  No matter how the boundaries of a 
taxonomic taxon may vary in the opinion of zoologists the valid name of such a taxon is 
determined . . . from the name-bearing type(s) considered to belong within those 
boundaries. . . . Once fixed, name-bearing types are stable and provide objective 
continuity in the application of names.  Thus the name-bearing type of any nominal 
taxon, once fixed in conformity with the provisions of the Code, is not subject to change 
except in the case of nominal genus-group taxa as provided in Article 70.3.2, of nominal 
species-group taxa as provided in Articles 74 and 75, and by use of the plenary power of 
the Commission [Art. 81].  (ICZN Code, Article 61.1; emphases added). 
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There are three features of this principle of typification that I want to highlight and have 
indicated by the italics above.  The first is that the central function of a holotype is to serve as an 
objective standard of reference, and in particular, a standard of reference for the application of 
the name it bears.  This role of being an objective standard of reference is one that I argue 
characterizes all scientific types.   
 A second key point in the ICZN's principle of typification is that name-bearing types 
(holotypes) function to provide a stability and coherence across the scientific community.  For 
effective communication, it is important that scientists are using terms in the same way, and 
know when they are referring to the same taxon.  As has been emphasized in the scientific 
literature on holotypes,  
species names provide the most consistent anchor to which all taxonomic, ecological, 
molecular, conservation, and other biologically relevant data are attached.  Legal 
protection and policy are also linked with names on the assumption that the groups 
indicated by the names are consistent through time and among places. . . . Medical and 
veterinary implementation requires communication about unambiguous identifications. 
(Pyle and Michel 2008, p. 40)   
 
This is a vast community to coordinate, and scientific types are an effective tool by which to 
secure the needed consistency and stability.  This does not, of course, imply that our knowledge 
about these species or other taxonomic categories is fixed.  Scientific knowledge is continually 
changing, but in order to track that change there has to be stability and coherence in how names 
and terms are applied.  This function of providing stability and coherence within an evolving 
scientific practice is, as we will see, a general feature of all scientific types.   
 Finally, a third feature of the principle of typification—and the one most relevant to the 
necessity-contingency debate in the philosophy of biology that I will discuss below in section 
3—is the clause that says a holotype is not subject to change except in cases of Articles 70.3.2, 
74, 75, and 81.  In other words, a holotype is taken conventionally to be infallible in picking out 
the taxon that it names—except in a variety of special circumstances.  I will return to discuss 
what those special circumstances are and their philosophical implications in section 4.2.   
 It is important to emphasize that a holotype does not define a taxon in the sense of 
determining how a given species is delimited.  That is a substantive empirical question whose 
answer evolves as scientific research progresses, and opinions about "lumping" versus "splitting" 
evolve.  As former ICZN executive secretary Ellinor Michel and Richard Pyle note, the "process 
of typification allows the name to be tied to a physical standard (and hence provides an objective 
basis for identifications), but leaves room for taxonomy to change" (Pyle and Michel 2008, p. 
41).  They offer the following diagram (Fig. 1) to illustrate the way in which type specimens 
function as a bridge between taxonomy and nomenclature, having a foot in each.   
 
 
Figure 1: Type specimens as lying at the intersection of taxonomy and nomenclature. 
Reproduced from Pyle and Michel 2008, Figure 2.   
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To summarize this subsection, then, we have seen that holotypes have three key features that can 
be found in the ICZN's principle of typification: First, its function is to serve as an objective 
standard of reference for the application of the name it bears; second, its purpose is to secure a 
stability and coherence of practice across a community of users; and third, a type specimen's role 
as standard is not typically subject to revision, but can in fact be revised in exceptional (though 
not necessarily rare) circumstances.  As I will show next, these three features can be found in the 
guidelines governing stratotypes in geology as well.   
 
2.2. Stratotypes 
Within geology, chronostratigraphy is the study and organization of the stratigraphic (rock) 
record in relation to geologic time.  Geologic time, which encompasses the some 4.5 billion 
years of Earth’s history, is itself organized into a hierarchical set of named units known as the 
Geological Time Scale (GTS), the ongoing construction of which is a vast interdisciplinary 
effort.  There is a duality inherent in the GTS in that the named divisions refer both to 
chronostratigraphic ("time-rock") units, that is, all and only those rocks or strata formed during a 
certain interval of time, and to geochronologic units, which are purely temporal ("time") units.  
So, for example, the 'Jurassic' refers both to the geochronologic ("time") unit, the Jurassic Period, 
and to the chronostratigraphic ("time-rock") unit, the Jurassic System (the set of all rocks formed 
during the Jurassic Period).  This duality is preserved through all taxonomic levels of the GTS 
hierarchy.  Much like the biological taxonomic hierarchy of species-genus-family-order-class, 
the chronostratigraphic ("time-rock") hierarchy includes stage-series-system-erathem-eonothem, 
which parallels the geochronologic (time) hierarchy of age-epoch-period-era-eon.   Although 
somewhat awkward, this duality is arguably important insofar as the stratigraphic record (and the 
fossils or other materials it contains) is the material evidential base from which geologic time is 
inferred.   
 While it has long been recognized that at any given location, deeper stratigraphic layers 
correspond to periods further back in time, precisely which periods of geologic time are 
represented in the strata can vary dramatically from place to place.  Depending on local factors 
such as rates of erosion and uplift, the stratigraphic layers exposed at any given location can 
represent sediments deposited 50 years ago (in which case those rocks would be members of the 
Quaternary System), 150 million years ago when the stegosaurus dinosaurs roamed (making 
them part of the Jurassic System), or even 500 million years ago when the trilobites flourished 
(hence members of the Cambrian System).  Thus, the project of chronostratigraphy is to sort the 
various stratigraphic rocks around the world into the correct taxonomic "time-rock" bin, thereby 
providing a complete chronostratigraphic classification.   
 In order for such a classification to be scientifically useful, there needs to be a clear and 
univocal nomenclature and understanding of precisely where the boundaries, marking the end of 
one chronostratigraphic unit and the beginning of another, fall.  For example, the infamous K-Pg 
boundary, which is the particular stratigraphic layer of rock recording the Chicxulub impact that 
killed off the nonavian dinosaurs, marks the end of the chronostratigraphic unit known as the 
Cretaceous System and the beginning of the next chronostratigraphic unit, the Paleogene 
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System.2  It is rare, however, to find such a clearly marked, relatively isochronous, and globally 
present event; hence in most cases, the precise boundaries between chronostratigraphic units 
need to be drawn at a particular stratigraphic layer somewhat conventionally.  The method that 
has been adopted by stratigraphers is the “GSSP” or “golden spike” method. 
 GSSP stands for Global Boundary Stratotype Section and Point, and it is a kind of 
boundary stratotype.  The Guidelines and Statutes of the International Commission on 
Stratigraphy (ICS) defines GSSPs as follows: 
This Boundary Stratotype Section and Point is the designated type of a stratigraphic 
boundary identified in published form and marked in the section as a specific point in a 
specific sequence of rock strata and constituting the standard for the definition and 
recognition of the stratigraphic boundary between two named global standard 
stratigraphic (chronostratigraphic) units. (Cowie et al. 1986, p. 5; emphases added) 
 
As we see in this definition, a GSSP is a concrete individual (i.e., a specific point in a particular 
series of rock strata at a particular locale, and typically marked and labeled with a metal "spike") 
that serves as a standard for the definition and recognition of the beginning of a named 
chronostratigraphic unit.  The decision to have the type designate a chronostratigraphic boundary 
(such as the Permian-Triassic boundary), rather than a whole chronostratigraphic unit (e.g., the 
Triassic System) arises from the desire to have a system of chronostratigraphic units that 
completely covers the Geologic Time Scale without any gaps or overlapping units.  So the GSSP 
at the Permian-Triassic boundary (which is marked at a particular point in the base of Bed 27c of 
Meishan section D, in Southern China) marks the beginning of the Triassic chronostratigraphic 
unit and the end of the Triassic is marked by the boundary stratotype defining the beginning of 
the next chronostratigraphic unit, the Jurassic (which is a GSSP "golden spike" placed in the 
Kuhjoch section of the Karwendel mountains in the Northern Calcareous Alps, Austria).3   
 As the ICS guidelines clarify, the GSSP defines not just the chronostratigraphic ("time-
rock") unit, but is also taken to define a moment of time: "Insistence on a Boundary Stratotype 
Point is in order to define without a doubt an instant of geologic time" (Cowie et al. 1986, p. 5).  
In other words, the GSSP also defines the moment of time at which the corresponding 
geochronologic ("time") unit begins.  So, for example, the GSSP in Meishan, Southern China 
defines not just the beginning of the Triassic System but also the start of the Triassic Period.  
Importantly, this moment of time is not defined in terms of a numerical "absolute" time age, but 
rather is defined stratigraphically as a precise moment in "relative" time.  If there is suitable 
material at the boundary to be radiometrically dated, then an absolute age may be associated with 
the boundary, but it is not taken to define the moment in time.  Indeed the absolute ages 
associated with boundaries like the Permo-Triassic are fallible, and are often revised as 
radiometric dating methods are iteratively improved (for a philosophical discussion see Bokulich 
2020).   
                                                
2 It thus by default also marks the boundary of any smaller chronostratigraphic units, in this case, 
the end of the Upper Cretaceous Series and beginning of the Paleocene Series, and the end of the 
Maastrichtian Stage and beginning of the Danian Stage.   
3 A single GSSP is placed for each chronostratigraphic boundary, but there is no requirement that 
successive GSSPs be anywhere near each other.  Hence, as discussed below, the scientific 
challenge is to use empirical evidence to extend that point into an isochronous horizon around 
the world.   
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 Stratotype points are thus the only places where geoscientists know (by definition) that 
time-rock and time coincide.  The scientific challenge then is to extend this chronostratigraphic 
boundary around the world.  Although there is some degree of arbitrariness in where exactly a 
GSSP is placed, GSSP locations are chosen with two guiding criteria: first, the GSSP should be 
placed in "continuous" sections with no breaks or unconformities in the sedimentary record, 
which would represent "missing" time of unknown duration, and hence not uniquely define a 
moment of time.  And, second, GSSPs should be placed where there are clear markers that 
facilitate global correlatability.  Biostratigraphic events, like the lowest (first) occurrence or 
highest (last) occurrence of a fossil species are the most common "primary markers" for 
chronostratigraphic boundaries in the Phanerozoic, but correlatability is improved by having 
many "secondary markers," which can be other biostratigraphic events, magnetostratigraphic 
reversals (records of flips in Earth's magnetic north and south poles), stable isotope excursions, 
etc.  The stratotype for the beginning of the Triassic, for example, has as its primary marker the 
lowest occurrence (first appearance datum) of the conodont fossil Hindeodus parvus, which is an 
extinct eel-like species.  And the end of the Triassic (beginning of Jurassic) has as its primary 
marker the first appearance of the smooth Psiloceras spela group Ammonite.  These biologic 
markers are used to identify and globally extend, but not define, the stratotype.  Nonetheless, this 
epistemic dependence of most stratotypes on biological index fossils makes them subject to 
many traditional philosophical issues in biology, such as the species problem (for a discussion 
see McGowran 2005).   
 As we have seen, stratotypes (GSSPs) provide a material standard of reference for the 
definition and recognition of the base of a named chronostratigraphic (and corresponding 
geochronologic) unit.  The stratotype thus fixes the reference of that named chronostratigraphic 
unit, providing a taxonomic class into which stratigraphic rocks all over the world can be sorted 
(e.g., the class of all rocks formed during the Cambrian Period).  Although designating a 
stratotype is an act of stipulation, determining which other rocks belong in that taxon is of course 
a substantive empirical project.  Like biological holotypes, stratotype 'specimens' must be in 
publically accessible localities for scientific consultation, and a ratified scientific type requires 
not just the physical specimen, but also its detailed description in an official scientific 
publication. 
 More broadly, the purpose of stratotypes is to secure a stability and coherence of 
scientific nomenclature and practice across a diverse community of scientists.  As many 
geoscientists lamented, prior to the institution of stratotypes, "names of the supposedly 'standard' 
periods, epochs, and ages were used in significantly different ways by geologists in different 
parts of the world" (Walsh et al. 2004, p. 202).  By providing an objective anchor for a 
taxonomic name in a material standard governed by an international scientific organization, 
scientific types are an effective tool for securing the necessary coherence.  Insofar as stratotypes, 
are conventionally taken to be permanent, they also function to provide stability.  However, as a 
recent paper from UK's Stratigraphy Commission notes, the situation can be a little more 
complicated in practice.   
GSSPs, once ratified, are generally regarded as fixed.  There are in fact a few conditions 
which permit revision of an existing GSSP such as its having been destroyed or become 
inaccessible.  A GSSP can also be changed 'if a strong demand arises out of research 
subsequent to its establishment,  But in the meantime it will give a stable point of 
reference.' (Smith et al. 2015, p. 40, with quotation from Remane et al. 1996, p. 80) 
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Thus, although stratotypes are taken to be permanent, fixing the reference of a named 
chronostratigraphic unit base and defining the corresponding instant of geologic time, the 
guidelines of the relevant international organization (here the ICS) provide for various 
circumstances under which the scientific type can be revised, as we also saw in the case of 
holotypes.  I will return to discuss what those special circumstances are for stratotypes in section 
4.3.   
 Once again, we see in the case of stratotypes that a scientific type's function is to, first, 
serve as an objective standard of reference for the application of the name it bears; second, 
secure a stability and coherence of practice across a community of users; and third, that a 
scientific type's role as standard is not typically subject to revision, but can in fact be revised in 
exceptional circumstances.  Before elaborating this general characterization, however, I will 
examine a third and final example of scientific types: measurement prototypes. 
 
2.3 Prototypes: Measurement Standards 
Although we often take for granted the units by which we measure world, such as the meter and 
the kilogram, there is a highly complex field known as metrology that is devoted to making sure 
that in meaning and practice, we are all in agreement about these units.  The international 
organization responsible for governing these various units of measurement is the International 
Bureau of Weights and Measures, or BIPM (after the French Bureau International des Poids et 
Measures).  BIPM describes its mandate as "providing the basis for a single, coherent system of 
measurements to be used throughout the world" (BIPM 2019b).  One of the primary ways that 
BIPM has traditionally secured this stability and coherence is through the use of physical 
measurement standards known as prototypes.  Within metrology, a prototype is defined as a 
concrete object or artefact that serves as the basis of the definitive definition or realization of its 
unit of measure.4 
 One example of a prototype is the International Prototype Meter, which is a particular 
metal bar formed out of a platinum and iridium alloy and conserved at the BIPM in Sèvres, 
France.  This particular bar served as the basis of the definition of the meter from 1889 until 
1960.  Recognizing the influence of temperature, pressure, and gravity on this metal artefact, the 
definition of the meter was more precisely formulated in 1927 as follows:5 
The unit of length is the metre, defined by the distance, at 0°, between the axes of the two 
central lines marked on the bar of platinum–iridium kept at the Bureau International des 
Poids et Mesures and declared Prototype of the metre by the 1st Conférence Générale des 
Poids et Mesures, this bar being subject to standard atmospheric pressure and supported 
on two cylinders of at least one centimetre diameter, symmetrically placed in the same 
horizontal plane at a distance of 571 mm from each other. (BIPM 2019a, SI, 9th ed., p. 
159). 
 
This prototype meter could then be compared to secondary standards of similarly constructed 
bars, which were distributed around the world for the standardization of measurements.  Only the 
original prototype bar stored in Sèveres, however, served as the basis of the definition of a meter.  
                                                
4 By 'realization' one means the conversion  of a theoretical quantity to reality. 
5 Even the original 1889 definition of the meter specified that is was the "prototype, at the 
temperature of melting ice, [that] shall henceforth represent the metric unit of length" 
(https://www.bipm.org/en/CGPM/db/1/1/). 
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Whatever the length of this scientific type was (under the above conditions), it was by definition 
exactly one meter.   
 Another example of a measurement prototype is the International Prototype Kilogram 
(known as IPK or the 'Big K').  The IPK is a concrete artefact made of a platinum-iridium alloy, 
machined into a right-circular cylinder, and stored in the BIPM headquarters in Sèvres, France.  
Also established in 1889, the IPK served as the definition and basis of the realization of the 
kilogram:  
The kilogram is the unit of mass; it is equal to the mass of the international prototype of 
the kilogram. . . . It follows that the mass of the international prototype of the kilogram is 
always 1 kilogram exactly." (BIPM 2006, SI 8th ed., p. 112)   
 
Although the stipulative definition takes the mass of the IPK to always be exactly 1 kilogram, the 
real world is little messier (literally).  After giving the above definition of the kilogram in terms 
of the mass of the prototype, they immediately go on to note the following: 
However, due to the inevitable accumulation of contaminants on surfaces, the 
international prototype is subject to reversible surface contamination that approaches 1µg 
per year in mass.  For this reason, the CIPM [Comité International des Poids et Mesures] 
declared that, pending further research, the reference mass of the international prototype 
is that immediately after cleaning and washing by a specified method." (BIPM 2006, SI 
8th ed., p. 112) 
 
This (cleaned) IPK thus served as the realization of the definition of the kilogram and the 
reference standard against which other, secondary national kilogram standards could be 
calibrated.   
 Both the International Prototype Meter and the International Prototype Kilogram are 
examples of scientific types that serve as an objective standard of reference for, and realization 
of, the definition of their kind.  Their purpose, as we saw, is to secure a coherence and stability 
of practice across a community of users.  Finally, a prototype is intended to have a permanence 
and not be subject to revision.  Like holotypes and stratotypes, however, they can in fact be 
revised in exceptional circumstances.  The prototype meter's status as a type definition was 
revised in 1960 and the IPK's status as the type definition of the kilogram was revised in 2019.  I 
will return to discuss the circumstances that prompted these revisions in section 4.1.   
 
2.4 Understanding Scientific Types and Their Functions 
Although occurring in different fields and involving subtle differences, there is a common focal 
function and status to holotypes, stratotypes, and measurement prototypes, that I argue unites all 
three under the rubric of 'scientific type'.  To capture this commonality, I propose the following 
general definition: A scientific type is a concrete individual object that serves as an objective 
standard of reference for, and realization of, the definition or taxon category it names.  This 
general definition is derived from, and supported by, the detailed analyses of the three cases 
given in the preceding subsections.  
 As we have seen, all three types involve tying a theoretical kind category to a single 
physical object that has a privileged status as the definitive anchor for the name or definition of 
that kind of thing.  All three have as their focal function serving as a publicly accessible standard 
of reference for their kind.  Furthermore, all three are tightly governed by the relevant 
international scientific organization and are taken by stipulation to be unrevisable, except by the 
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provisos of these organizations (as will be discussed in more detail in section 4).  More broadly, 
all three of these scientific types serve the purpose of securing a coherence and stability of 
practice across their relevant scientific communities, despite the recognition of an ever-evolving 
body of scientific knowledge.  There is a tension that should be noted here between a scientific 
type serving as part of a stipulative definition, hence conventionally defined to be infallible, and 
a scientific type serving the purpose of securing a stability and coherence of scientific practice.  
This tension motivates the Duhemian approach to scientific types I develop in section 5.  
 The general definition and account of scientific types I develop here is valuable not just 
for its own sake, but also because it provides a new framework within which to advance a 
number of recent debates in the philosophy of science and scientific practice.  I will show its 
fertility more concretely by using it to address the following three debates: the necessity-
contingency debate in philosophy of biology, the absolute accuracy of standards debate in 
philosophy of metrology, and the definition-correlation debate in stratigraphy.  With this deeper 
understanding of scientific types in hand, let us begin by first examining the philosophical debate 
that has arisen over biological holotypes and whether they belong necessarily or contingently to 
the species that they name, and see whether by placing holotypes within this broader class of 
scientific types, this debate can be further advanced.   
 
 
3. Holotypes and the Necessity-Contingency Debate 
One context in which the scientific practice of typification has attracted some philosophical 
attention is the necessity-contingency debate over biological holotypes.  The debate began with a 
paper by Alex Levine (2001) in which he identified a paradox or "contradiction" about type 
specimens.  Levine introduces this paradox in the context of another, well-known debate over 
whether species should be understood as kinds or individuals (although the paradox arguably 
arises regardless of which position one takes on that species debate).  In advocating the species-
as-individuals view, David Hull had noted that the practice of fixing species names through type 
specimens (holotypes) suggests that they function as rigid designators: species names "cannot 
change their reference, although we can find out that we are mistaken about what we thought 
their reference was" (Hull 1982, p. 492).  Since the nomenclatural principle of priority (ICZN 
Code, Article 23) means that the name follows the type specimen regardless of which species it 
is placed in, it looks like the relation between a type specimen and the species it typifies is 
necessary.  However it also seems that a type specimen, like any other organism, belongs only 
contingently to its species.  Levine summarizes the paradox as follows:  
We can only conclude that, qua organism, the type specimen belongs to its respective 
species contingently, while qua type specimen, it belongs necessarily.  But this statement 
merely codifies the contradiction without resolving it. (Levine 2001, p. 334) 
 
Like any good paradox, sorting out whether holotypes belong necessarily or contingently to their 
species turned out to be surprisingly subtle question, giving rise to a philosophical debate.   
 The first proposed solution came from Joseph LaPorte, who argues that the paradox 
stems from a failure to distinguish de dicto and de re readings of necessity.  He explains, 
The de dicto sentence 'Necessarily, any species with a type specimen contains its type 
specimen' is true if and only if . . . 'Any species with a type specimen contains its type 
specimen'. This does seem to be true in any possible world. . . .The de re sentence 'Any 
species with a type specimen necessarily contains its type specimen' is true if and only if 
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any species with a type specimen in the actual world contains that very type specimen in 
every possible world.  This reading does not seem to be true. (LaPorte 2003, p. 587) 
 
While he concludes that a type specimen belongs only contingently to its species, he goes on to 
argue that it can in fact be known a priori that it belongs to it, hence providing an example of 
contingent a priori knowledge.  Using the example of Rover as the holotype for Canis familiaris, 
he continues, "Although it is contingent that Canis familiaris contains Rover, it is a priori certain 
that Canis familiaris does contain Rover since Rover is, in the actual world, the type specimen 
for Canis familiaris" (LaPorte 2003, p. 587).  Of course what is known a priori is known with 
certainty, but that does not mean it is necessary.  Hence that a type specimen belongs to its 
species is, he argues, an example of contingent a priori knowledge.   
 In a follow-up article, Matthew Haber agrees that type specimens belong only 
contingently to their species, but denies that it can be known a priori.  More specifically, he 
rejects the view that even de dicto necessity holds. He argues, "de dicto necessity fails, and it 
fails in the actual world. This happens every time a type specimen is misidentified—something 
that should not be possible if type specimens belong of de dicto necessity to their species" 
(Haber 2012, p. 774).  He supports this view by appealing to an actual case from scientific 
practice, where a type specimen was declared not to belong to the species that it named.  Very 
briefly, the case involved two subspecies of the garter snake species known as Thamnophis 
sirtalis (T.s.): One was the common California Red-Sided Garter Snake, T.s. infernalis, and the 
other was the endangered San Francisco Garter Snake, T.s. tetraenia.  In the mid-1990s 
researchers discovered that the holotype specimen for the common T.s. infernalis was in fact a 
member of the endangered T.s. tetraenia.  While the nomenclatural principle of priority (Article 
23) prescribes that the name T.s. infernalis should in such cases be transferred to the endangered 
T.s. tetraenia, researchers successfully petitioned (using Article 75.6) that the names be 
conserved for each, and that a new holotype (i.e., a neotype) be designated T.s. infernalis.  The 
upshot, as Haber notes, is that we cannot know a priori that a type specimen belongs to the 
species it names, since in this actual case, the holotype for the common T.s. infernalis was not in 
fact a member of that species.  I will come back in a moment to discuss the ICZN rules that 
permit these sorts of revisions to holotypes, but before doing so, there is one more twist in this 
debate that must be examined. 
 While the previous two papers seemed to be converging on the view that holotypes 
belong only contingently to their species, the most recent paper in this debate by Joeri Witteveen 
argues that is a mistake.  More specifically, he argues pace LaPorte and Haber that there is no 
sense in which type specimens belong contingently to the species they name; rather they belong 
necessarily.  While Witteveen raises a number of criticisms, it is his critique of Haber that I want 
to specifically focus on.  He writes, 
To falsify de dicto necessity, it is not sufficient for a type specimen to fail to belong to 
the taxon for which it formerly served as name-bearer.  Instead, it must be possible for a 
type specimen to fail to belong to the taxon for which it actually serves as name-bearer. 
(Witteveen 2015, p. 580).   
 
According to Witteveen, such a situation is not possible.  He offers the following helpful 
diagram, which outlines three scenarios.   
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Figure 2: Figure from Witteveen (2015, p. 581) describing three different scenarios regarding the 
relationship between a specimen x, its name 'S', the taxon that name designates, and the taxon to 
which the specimen belongs.  
 
In the first scenario, a, the type specimen works as intended: specimen x carries the name 'S' that 
designates taxon S, and x in fact belongs to taxon S.  The second situation, b, is the situation that 
Haber's example of the California garter snake was intended to describe: specimen x carries the 
name 'S' ('T.s. infernalis') that designates taxon S (T.s. infernalis), but the specimen x in fact 
belongs to taxon T (T.s. tetraenia).  The third scenario, c, describes the situation after the old 
holotype was set aside and a neotype was designated for T.s. infernalis.  With this diagram in 
hand, Witteveen then notes 
This leaves us with the question whether it is possible in principle to arrive at the 
situation depicted in Fig. [b]. . . . [Is it] possible for a type specimen to belong to one 
taxon while carrying the name for another taxon? The answer has to be 'no.' (Witteveen 
2015, p. 581) 
 
According to Witteveen, the type method is infallible: it is impossible for the name of a type 
specimen to designate a different taxon than that to which it belongs.  Thus he concludes that de 
dicto necessity holds. 
 Although Witteveen provides an insightful analysis of the necessity-contingency debate 
and method of typification, I will argue that he is mistaken.  In particular, he is wrong to think 
that it is impossible to arrive at the situation described in scenario b, where a type specimen 
carries the name designating one taxon, but in fact belongs to another.  More generally, I will 
argue that his argument falls prey to a version of what has been called the "myth of the absolute 
accuracy of standards."  As will become clear in section 5, Witteveen is essentially making the 
same sort of mistake that Duhem criticized the conventionalists for making.   
 
 
4. Myth of the Absolute Accuracy of Standards 
Is the method of typification infallible as Witteveen argues?  Although types are taken by 
convention to be infallible, scientists are fully aware that in practice types are in fact fallible.  
Although Witteveen is correct that the type method is designed to be typically insulated from 
such errors in taxonomic practice, I will argue that it is not in fact immune.  A full defense of this 
will require two parts: first, an understanding of the various conditions under which scientific 
types can be revised or rejected; and second, an account of how scientists are able to arrive at the 
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sort of situation described in scenario b above, that Witteveen claims is impossible.  I begin by 
reviewing some of the conditions and provisos that allow a scientific type to be recognized as 
inadequate, which will lay the foundation for the Duhemian approach to scientific types that I 
outline in section 5.  In the context of measurement prototypes, these conditions of inadequacy 
have been used to argue against what Eran Tal calls the "myth of the absolute accuracy of 
measurement standards."  I will argue that we should extend the recognition and rejection of this 
myth to all scientific types.   
 
4.1 Revising Prototypes 
In the context of his work in the philosophy of metrology, Eran Tal has identified what he calls 
the myth of the absolute accuracy of standards.  He writes, 
A common philosophical myth states that the meter bar in Paris is exactly 1 meter long. . 
. . One variant of the myth comes from Wittgenstein. . . . Kripke . . . develops a variant of 
the same myth by stating that the length of the bar at a specified time is rigidly designated 
by the phrase 'one meter.'  Neither of these pronouncements is easily reconciled with the 
1960 declaration of the General Conference on Weights and Measures, according to 
which 'the International Prototype does not define the metre with an accuracy adequate 
for the present needs of metrology'. (Tal 2011, pp. 1082-83)6 
 
Tal's point is that scientific practice in metrology has routinely been able to make sense of the 
fact that a prototype standard can fail to be a sufficiently accurate realization of the unit it is used 
to define.  Tal's analysis in the above paper turns to the example of the temporal standard for the 
second, showing how the myth also fails in that context, but here I will instead illustrate the point 
with the example of the prototype kilogram.   
 The International Prototype Kilogram (IPK) is a particularly instructive case because it is 
an example of a prototype that was recently judged to provide an insufficiently accurate basis for 
the definition of its unit of measure, leading to the formal redefinition of the kilogram in May of 
2019.7  If the kilogram was defined to be whatever the IPK weighed, then how could it be judged 
inadequate?  To what independent standard could one appeal to make such a judgment?  If there 
were such an independent standard, then it would be possible to be in a situation analogous to 
Witteveen's scenario b: The mass of the platinum-iridium artefact in Sèvres carries the name 
'1. 00 kg' which then designates the class of things having the property of a one kilogram mass.  
However, if there were an independent standard, then we would be able to say that the mass of 
the platinum-iridium artefact in Sèvres belongs, for example, to the class of things that are 
0.99999995 kg.  On Witteveen's reading of scientific types, there can be no such independent 
standard, and hence there could never be a determination that the IPK is anything other than 1. 00 kg.   
                                                
6 Tal notes that while Wittgenstein and Kripke helped spread this myth, their own positions were 
arguably more subtle.   
7 As of May 20th, 2019 the kilogram is now "defined by taking the fixed numerical value of the 
Planck constant h to be 6.626 070 15 × 10−34 when expressed in the unit J s, which is equal to 




 Although the IPK’s mass is stipulated to be exactly one kilogram, metrologists have 
never had a problem making sense of the fact that as a material artefact in the real world, its mass 
varies over time.  Even before the redefinition of the kilogram, while the IPK was taken by 
definition to be exactly 1 kg with zero error, metrologists knew on the basis of background 
knowledge, experience, and theory that the IPK absorbs contamination from the atmosphere 
(even when stored under three bell jars).  Hence, in the years between 1939 and 1946 they 
developed the BIPM cleaning method for the IPK and its sisters (Girard 1990).  It was known 
that cleaning would remove between 5µg – 60µg, and that it would begin to gain mass again 
right afterwards.  As one sources explains,  
“After cleaning—even when they are stored under their bell jars—the IPK and its 
replicas immediately began gaining mass again.  The BIPM even developed a model of 
this gain and concluded that it averaged 1.11µg per month for the first 3 months after 
cleaning and then decreased to an average of 1µg per year thereafter.” (IPK, Wikipedia; 
see also Girard 1990).   
 
This result is depicted in Figure 3 below, which shows the change of mass of the IPK (designated 
K) and its “identical” sister copies.   
 
 
Fig. 3: The change of mass Dm of the International Prototype Kilogram (K) compared to 
its sister copies after a first and second cleaning.  From Girard 1990, Figure 15.  
 
As we see in this figure, even in 1990 when the IPK definition of the kilogram was in full sway, 
metrologists could make sense of the changes in the IPK’s mass under different conditions.   
 One source, or component, of an independent standard is precisely this network of 
background knowledge, experience, and theory that recognizes the physical causes of these 
fluctuations in the IPK’s mass.  I argue that this ability to recognize that the material standard 
does not exactly belong to the class that it designates is actually a crucially important feature that 
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allows metrologists to help the IPK better realize its ideal status as the unit prototype.  Indeed if 
metrologists could only theorize the mass of the IPK as exactly 1 kg during its reign, then they 
would not have been able to succeed in constructing as accurate and stable a system of 
measurement as they did.   
 A second, related component of the independent standard by which the IPK’s mass could 
be judged is through the periodic verifications of prototypes.  Three such periodic verifications 
have been carried out, in 1889, 1948, and 1989.  This involved a careful comparison of the mass 
of the IPK and its six official copies, as well as a comparison of two of those copies with the 
platinum-iridium national prototypes from 34 countries.  The results of these three periodic 
verifications revealed that the IPK, its six sister copies, and other kilogram prototypes have been 
steadily diverging in mass from each other, as can be seen in Figure 4: 
 
Fig. 4: Mass drift of national prototype kilograms and two IPK sister prototype kilograms relative to 
the IPK, which is depicted in accordance with its definition as being exactly 1 kilogram, and hence 
not having had any change of mass over the 100 year period of comparisons. (Source: Wikimedia 
commons) 
 
Although metrologists may stipulate that the error in the mass of the IPK is exactly zero, they use 
the results of intercomparisions such as this to try to assess its stability empirically.  Hence these 
empirical comparisons provide a kind of independent standard by which to judge the mass of the 
IPK.  In his article, “The Kilogram: The Present State of Our Knowledge”, BIPM metrologist 
Terry Quinn summarized the results of the last periodic verification as follows:  
It appears that the copies are increasing mass as a function of time with respect to the 
international prototype to the extent of about 0.5µg per year (5 parts in 1010 per year).  An 
alternative, and from the evidence of Fig. [4] perhaps more probable, interpretation is that 
the mass of the international prototype is falling with respect to that of its copies. (Quinn 
1991, p. 83) 
 
Although there may be a problem of underdetermination whether it is in reality the some dozen 
copies all increasing and the IPK holding steady, or the IPK losing mass relative to those dozen 
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copies, the latter interpretation is, given our background knowledge, more probable.  Here we see 
quite clearly that background knowledge about contamination and cleaning, and additional 
empirical knowledge from intercomparisons, do in fact provide an independent (albeit fallible) 
standard by which the mass of the IPK can be judged.   
 Indeed, it was in the wake of this last intercomparison that the metrology community 
judged that we were in a situation analogous to Witteveen’s scenario b, and hence initiated the 
long and difficult process to stipulatively redefine kilogram, a process which was not complete 
until 28 years later in May 2019.  I want to argue that it was precisely the metrologists’ discovery 
that we were in a scenario like b that prompted them to make the stipulative redefinition, moving 
from scenario a (the IPK artefact definition of the kilogram) to the current scenario c (the new 
Planck-constant-tied definition of the kilogram8).  Without the possibility of being in a scenario 
like b, it is not clear how one can make sense of the decision to undertake the difficult 
redefinition.  The decision was neither arbitrary nor based on a whim, which if it was purely a 
matter of stipulation it would seem to be; rather it was a decision made reluctantly under an 
increasingly heavy burden of evidence.  Moreover, as I hope it is becoming increasingly clear, it 
was crucially important that metrologists keep this independent "common sense" standard in 
mind.  If in fact the IPK had continued to lose mass, but had stipulatively been maintained as 
exactly 1kg, then, for example, the doses of pharmaceutical drugs would have had to be steadily 
adjusted, potentially reaching harmful thresholds for the human body.  The world is under no 
obligation to respect our stipulative pronouncements on the accuracy of scientific types, and 
insofar as scientists must use those scientific types to guide their interactions with the world, they 
cannot afford to ignore that failure of coherence.   
 As we have seen in this case study, there is a complicated interplay between stipulation 
and empirical discovery in the specification of scientific types.  Although scientific types 
function as a stipulative standard, and hence seem to be infallible, there is an independent 
standard by which such scientific types can be judged, and that is in terms of a broader coherence 
with a background network of scientific practice, evidence, theory, and auxiliary knowledge—
what in anticipation of the Duhemian analysis we might collectively call a “non-symbolic” or 
“common sense” standard (without the latter term in any way suggesting that it need be obvious).  
With this understanding of the myth of the absolute accuracy of measurement standards in hand, 
we are now in a position to see how it can be extended to other scientific types. 
 
4.2: Revising Holotypes  
Passing comparisons of holotypes to measurement prototypes can be found in the literature, 
though such comparisons have never been explored in detail.  For example, in noting the ICZN's 
understanding of a holotype as an objective international standard of reference, Witteveen 
remarks, "In this sense a type specimen is not much different from other archived reference 
standards, like the International Prototype Kilogram" (2015, p. 583).  I want to argue that they 
are indeed alike, but in a sense that has not been widely appreciated for either.  As Witteveen, 
Haber, and others have noted, the ICZN's code does have several articles pertaining to the 
revision of type specimens.  However, it is worth taking a closer look at the precise wording of 
these articles in order to better understand what motivates them.   
                                                
8 Of course in the case of the kilogram the new definition is no longer in terms of an artefact 
scientific type. 
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 There are four articles in the International Code of Zoological Nomenclature that pertain 
to the revision of type specimens.  The first is Article 70.3 titled Misidentified type species: 
If an author discovers that a type species was misidentified . . . the author may select, and 
thereby fix as type species, the species that will, in his or her judgement, best serve 
stability and universality, either 70.3.1. the nominal species previously cited as type 
species . . . or 70.3.2 the taxonomic species actually involved in the misidentification. 
(ICZN Code, Article 70.3; emphasis added) 
 
Although this article concerns type species, rather than type specimens, it is nonetheless relevant 
to assessing the method of typification.  The type species is the name-bearing type of the 
nominal genus; i.e., it is the species that first fixes the reference of, or "defines," a new genus 
taxonomic category.  It thus functions in the same way as a type specimen serving as the 
objective standard of reference for the name it bears.  There are two things to note about the 
above article: First, the notion of misidentification is conceptually possible within the rules of the 
system of typification and, moreover, it is treated as temporally prior to the revision of the type.  
Such a misidentification can, thus, be cashed out in terms of the analog of Witteveen's scenario b 
in Fig. 2.  The second key feature to note in the above article is the importance placed on a type 
species being able to "serve stability and universality."  When identification goes awry, the goal 
that the scientist is required to keep in mind is that of finding a specimen that enables a 
coherence of practice across time (i.e., stability) and across space (i.e., universality).   
 The second article in the ICZN's code relevant to the revision of types is Article 74 and 
concerns when the name-bearing type has been based on a series of specimens (syntype) rather 
than a single specimen.  Article 74 allows the name-bearing function to be concentrated from a 
collection of specimens to a single individual that then becomes the type specimen (lectotype) 
and deprives the other specimens of their former name-bearing function.  This article can be 
invoked, for example, when the specimens in the syntype series are found to belong to different 
species.  As Recommendation 74G indicates, "the designation of lectotypes should be done as 
part of a revisionary or other taxonomic work to enhance the stability of nomenclature, and not 
for mere curatorial convenience" (ICZN Code, Article 74.G).  As we see here, recognition of the 
need to revise taxonomy should precede the revision of types and when types are not working to 
enhance stability, they should be revised accordingly.   
 The third article relevant to the revision of types is Article 75, which involves the 
conditions for designating a new type specimen (neotype) when the previous type specimen is 
recognized to be inadequate.  This can happen for a number of reasons as the ICZN code states 
(with emphases added):  
1. When there is "the express purpose of clarifying the taxonomic status or the type 
locality9 of a nominal taxon" (75.3.1). 
2. When a holotype is believed "to be lost or destroyed" and a physical type specimen is 
needed (i.e., no published descriptions or pictures are adequate) (75.3.4). 
3. "A neotype may be based on a different sex or life stage if necessary or desirable to 
secure stability of nomenclature" (75.3.5). 
                                                
9 'Type locality' is being used here in a broader sense (than that of stratotype discussed in section 
2.2) to mean the geographical or stratigraphical location where the type specimen was collected.   
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4. "When an author considers that the taxonomic identity of a nominal species-group 
taxon cannot be determined from its existing name-bearing type . . . and stability or 
universality are threatened thereby" (75.5). 
5. "When an author discovers that the existing name-bearing type of a nominal species-
group taxon is not in taxonomic accord with the prevailing usage of names and stability 
or universality is threatened thereby" (75.6) 
 
This last condition of the article (75.6) was the one invoked in the case involving T.s. infernalis 
cited by Haber (2012) and discussed in section 3.  A recurring theme in these conditions for the 
revision of type specimens is that they are failing to secure a stability and coherence 
("universality") of nomenclatural practice.  And as we see in this last condition especially, the 
revision can be prompted when the type specimen gets too far out of "taxonomic accord" with 
the prevailing usage.  As I will argue more below, this suggests that "taxonomic accord with 
prevailing usage" is functioning here as an independent standard by which to judge the accuracy 
of a type specimen in picking out the taxon to which it belongs.  In other words, a type specimen 
might carry the name 'S' that designates taxon S, but by the criterion of "taxonomic accord with 
prevailing usage" the type specimen belongs to a different taxon, T, thus landing us in the 
scenario b that Witteveen claims is impossible in the ICZN's system of typification.  As Article 
75 makes clear, such a situation is possible according to ICZN code rules, and it is the 
nomenclature that should, in such cases, bend to the prevailing usage.  
 The final article in the code relevant to our discussion is Article 81 regarding the purpose 
and extent of plenary power of the International Commission on Zoological Nomenclature: 
The Commission has the plenary power . . . to modify the application of provisions of the 
Code to a particular case, if such application would in its judgement disturb stability or 
universality or cause confusion.  For the purpose of preventing such disturbance and of 
promoting a stable and universally accepted nomenclature, it may by use of its plenary 
power, conserve, totally, partially, or conditionally suppress, or give a specified 
precedence to, or make available any name, type fixation or other nomenclatural act, or 
any publication, and establish replacements. (81.1) 
 
As this "catch-all" article emphasizes, there are two criteria or standards by which to judge the 
adequacy of a scientific type: 1. By the rules of the principle of typification, and 2. By the extent 
to which that scientific type promotes a stable and universal system of nomenclature, minimizing 
confusion.  When all goes according to plan, these two criteria align: indeed, the system of 
typification is adopted precisely because it is typically the best method for securing a stable and 
universal—or "coherent"—practice.  But when these two criteria do come apart, Article 81.1 
makes it clear that it is the second "coherence" criterion that should ultimately take precedence.  
In other words, coherence with prevailing community practice is functioning as an independent 
"common sense" standard by which the adequacy of the scientific type can be judged.   
 
4.3 Revising Stratotypes and the Definition-Correlation Debate 
As we saw in section 2.2, a stratotype (or more precisely a global boundary stratotype section 
and point (GSSP)), is a specific place marked in a sequence of rock strata constituting the 
standard for the definition and recognition of the boundary marking the beginning of a named 
chronostratigraphic (and geochronologic) unit.  Like holotypes and prototypes, stratotypes are 
intended to have a permanence, but nonetheless there are provisos that allow for their revision.  
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As I will show, also like holotypes and stratotypes, those provisos can best be understood in 
terms of the ultimate purpose of stratotypes as a tool for securing a stability and coherence of 
scientific nomenclature and practice across a diverse community of scientists.  
 There are a number of interesting conceptual issues and ongoing methodological debates 
surrounding the practice of stratotypes.  One that is particularly relevant to our present concern 
with the myth of the absolute accuracy of scientific types is what might be called the definition-
correlation debate.  Stratigraphers have long debated whether correlation should precede 
definition, or whether definition should precede correlation.  As discussed before, it is only by 
time-correlating distant stratigraphic sections, and integrating them into a single 
chronostratigraphic scale (and hence Geologic Time Scale), that key events in Earth's history, 
such as global climate changes and mass extinctions, can be identified, and cause and effect can 
be investigated.  The question concerns the best way to secure such a consistently defined and 
globally correlated chronostratigraphic scale. 
 One philosophical approach goes back to Hollis Hedberg (1903-1988), who was a key 
architect in developing the international system of nomenclature and practice for stratigraphy, 
and the editor of the first edition of the International Stratigraphic Guide published in 1976.  In 
this Guide, Hedberg argues that definition must precede correlation: "Only after the type limits 
[boundary stratotypes] of a chronostratigraphic unit have been established [defined] can the 
limits be extended geographically beyond the type section [globally correlated]" (Hedberg 1976, 
p. 86).  Hence, according to Hedberg and subsequent thinkers such as Marie-Pierre Aubry 
(Aubry et al. 2000), a stratotype boundary must be conventionally defined first before the 
substantive scientific project of correlation, by means of biostratigraphic (e.g., first appearance of 
an index fossil) or other events (e.g., stable isotope excursions) can be undertaken; and by being 
prior, those definitions should be immune to changing scientific views about correlation.   
 The alternative philosophical view in this debate is that correlation must precede 
definition.  This is the view legislated by the revised guidelines of the International Commission 
Stratigraphy (ICS) adopted in 1996 and currently in effect.  As then chairman of the ICS, Jürgen 
Remane, and colleagues write:  
To define a boundary first and then evaluate its potential for long-range correlation (as 
has been proposed in some cases) will mostly lead to boundary definitions of limited 
practical value. (Remane et al. 1996, p. 78) 
 
On this view, boundary stratotypes should be placed not arbitrarily, but in those localities with a 
maximum (or at least sufficient) potential for global correlation.   
 One of the GSSPs that was placed prior to the revised guidelines (on the former 
"definition precedes correlation" approach) was the stratotype that defined the base of the 
Silurian System.  This GSSP was plagued with problems of correlatability, specifically 
"biostratigraphic deficiencies and even [a] lack [of] the key index fossils" (Rong et al. 2008, p. 
315).  A formal restudy by the Subcommission on Silurian Stratigraphy subsequently led to both 
the first revision of a GSSP and to the formulation of the general guidelines for how to revise a 
stratotype (Rong et al. 2008).  In a forerunner to this revision paper, they respond to the objection 
(by Holland et al. 2003) that, once defined, a GSSP should never be revised.  They write, 
The central important point raised by Holland et al. (2003) is the issue of stability in 
Silurian stratigraphy.  We agree that stability is of paramount importance now that the 
Silurian GSSPs have been defined for almost two decades and it is in the interests of both 
stability and precision in international correlation that these restudies are being 
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undertaken.  It is our view that reliance on a poorly defined GSSP does not lead to 
stability.  The examples of the two GSSPs selected for restudy illustrate this point well. 
(Melchin et al. 2004, p. 124)   
 
As these quotations make clear, both sides recognize that the ultimate purpose of a stratotype is 
to be a tool for securing a stability and coherence of practice in the face of ever-evolving 
scientific knowledge—a focal function that they share with holotypes and prototypes.  And, as 
we also saw in the case of holotypes, stratotypes are at the intersection of nomenclature and 
(stratigraphic) taxonomy, having one foot in each; hence they are not just about having a fixed 
system of definitions for their own sake, but rather are for the broader purpose of securing a 
coherent (universal and stable) system of scientific practice.  Thus the failure to secure such a 
coherent system of practice becomes an independent "common sense" standard by which to 
judge the inadequacy of the stratotype. 
 
 
5. A Duhemian Approach to Scientific Types  
My aim in this paper has been to call attention to an important component of taxonomic and 
nomenclatural scientific practice that has been largely overlooked by philosophers of science, 
namely typification and corresponding notion of a scientific type.  Through a close examination 
of the use of holotypes in biology, stratotypes in geology, and measurement prototypes in 
metrology, I have abstracted the following general definition: a scientific type is a concrete 
individual object that serves as a standard of reference for, and realization of, the definition or 
taxon category that it names.  I then showed the fertility of this new conception by using this 
general framework to address three debates: the necessity-contingency debate about holotypes, 
the absolute accuracy debate over measurement standards, and the definition-correlation debate 
about stratotypes.  In particular, we can recognize that although scientific types are defined 
conventionally through an act of stipulation, the fundamental purpose of scientific types is to 
secure a stability and coherence of scientific practice as new discoveries are made.  As we saw, 
this purpose can function as an independent "common sense" standard by which scientific types 
can be evaluated and various debates concerning them can be resolved.   
 With this detailed examination in hand, we are now in a position to further develop our 
general philosophical account of scientific types.  The account I want to defend draws its 
inspiration from Pierre Duhem's philosophy of science, and more specifically the framework he 
uses to critique conventionalism.  Although Duhem never (to my knowledge) discusses the 
practice of typification, his approach contains a number of insights that together can provide the 
foundation for a philosophy of scientific types.  These are found in his book The Aim and 
Structure of Physical Theory (hereafter The Aim), which despite its named focus on physical 
theory is actually motivated by reflections on biological classification.10  In particular, there are 
                                                
10 The Aim both opens and closes with a discussion of biological classification, where Duhem 
describes how zoologists aim to reconstruct the true tree of life, but only have access to these 
"relations of real family affiliation" indirectly through comparative anatomy.  Thus he sees 
biological taxonomy proceeding iteratively, aiming towards a natural classification where the 
abstract (or what he elsewhere calls "symbolic") entities and relations of the taxonomy reflect the 
true familial relations of real organisms.  Although interesting and underexplored, the details of 
Duhem's philosophy of biology are not directly relevant to our project here.   
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three elements I want to draw on: first, his understanding of theories as symbolic systems; 
second, his critique of conventionalism; and third, his notion of common sense.  Since these 
three elements of Duhem's philosophy are often not widely appreciated, it is worth briefly 
reviewing them in turn.   
 The first key element is Duhem's understanding of scientific theories as symbolic 
systems.  No matter how close a taxonomy comes to what Duhem calls a "natural classification"  
(Duhem [1914] 1954, p. 297), it will always be an abstraction or symbolic representation of a 
concrete world.  Traditionally this notion of symbolic system has been interpreted too narrowly 
to mean a theory mathematized by a system of equations, but on my view, Duhem intends the 
point to apply much more broadly to any theoretical system, including, for example, biological 
theories.  Duhem highlights this duality between the symbolic system and the concrete world at 
many different levels of scientific theorizing.  So, for example, he distinguishes between the 
concrete experimental apparatus and "a schematic model of the same instrument constructed 
with the aid of symbols supplied by theories", noting that "it is on this ideal and symbolic 
instrument that [the scientist] does his reasoning" (p. 156).  He moreover notes that when the 
latter is too simplistic a representation of the former, it can be corrected.  Similarly Duhem 
distinguishes between "concrete circumstances" or "practical facts" on the one hand, and 
"theoretical facts" on the other, noting how the former are turned into the latter through "the 
intermediary of measurements" (pp. 133-4).  Thus a central component of Duhem's philosophy 
of science is this distinction between a symbolic system and the world it is supposed to represent.   
 The second, and for our purposes most important, element from Duhem's philosophy of 
science is his critique of conventionalism (the conventionalism found, for example, in the work 
of Henri Poincaré and Edouard Le Roy).  The conventionalist thesis that Duhem wants to reject 
is that "certain fundamental hypotheses of physical theory cannot be contradicted by any 
experiment, because they constitute in reality definitions, and because certain expressions . . . 
take their meaning only through them" (p. 209).  He considers the example, cited by the 
conventionalists, that "free fall" of a body means its "acceleration is constant."  The 
conventionalist argues that such a law can never be contradicted by experiment because "it 
constitutes the very definition of what is meant by 'falling freely'," and that if a fall was not 
uniformly accelerated, then we would be forced to conclude that it was not free (p. 209).  
Duhem's response to this claim of the conventionalists is to distinguish between the "symbolic" 
meaning of the phrase as defined within a system of mechanics and the "common sense" 
meaning:   
The words 'free fall of a heavy body' now have two distinct meanings . . . they have their 
real meaning, and they mean what common sense means in pronouncing them; for the 
physicist they have a symbolic meaning, and mean 'uniformly accelerated motion.' (p. 
209-10)  
 
Duhem then asks us to suppose that we observe that 
a certain fall regarded by common sense as a free fall has a slightly variable acceleration.  
The proposition which in our theory gives its symbolic meaning to the words 'free fall' 
does not represent with sufficient accuracy the properties of the real and concrete fall we 
have observed. (p. 210) 
 
In this case Duhem argues, contra the conventionalists, that there are in fact two options 
available to the scientist: First,  
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we may declare that we were wrong in establishing a connection between the concrete 
fall we have observed and the symbolic free fall defined by our theory. . . . We may seek 
to eliminate by means of suitable 'corrections' the 'causes of error,' such as air resistance, 
which influenced our experiment. (pp. 210-211) 
 
This strategy is to hold the symbolic system fixed and attribute the error to our measurements or 
the world. According to the conventionalists, this is the only option, since 'uniformly accelerated 
motion' is the very definition of 'free fall'.  Although this will be the most commonly used 
strategy, Duhem argues the conventionalists are wrong in thinking it is the only strategy.  A 
second option, according to Duhem, is that 
we can declare that we were right in regarding the fall studied as a free fall and in 
requiring that the theoretical definition of these words agree with our observations. . . . 
Since our theoretical definition does not satisfy this requirement, it must be rejected; we 
must construct another mechanics on new hypotheses, a mechanics in which the words 
'free fall' no longer signify 'uniformly accelerated motion,' but 'fall whose acceleration 
varies according to a certain law.' (Duhem, p. 210) 
 
Although Duhem grants that the first strategy is typically to be preferred, it is up to the wisdom 
("good sense" or bon sens) of the scientist to know when the second option is called for.   
 The point I especially want to emphasize here is Duhem's recognition of two definitions 
of a term: a "symbolic one" (taken to be true by definition) and a "common sense" one.  For 
Duhem, the success of science rests on keeping both these two separate definitions in play and 
comparing one against the other.  While the hope is that they will normally coincide, when they 
do come apart there is a substantive scientific decision regarding how to proceed.  Although 
deference to our symbolic systems is usually called for, sometimes the wise choice is to have our 
symbolic systems bend to common sense.   
 This notion of "common sense" is the third element I want to draw on from Duhem's 
philosophy.  This too is often misunderstood, so a few brief comments are in order.  The first 
point is that in calling it 'common sense' he does not in any way mean to imply that it is 
'obvious'; rather, he means that it is outside the framework of a particular symbolic system.  
Second, Duhem actually has a more complex classification of different notions of "common 
sense," which are borrowed in part from Blaise Pascal and come out more explicitly in his work 
La Science Allemande (see Martin 1991 for a discussion).  It includes not just bon sens (good 
sense) but also connaissance commune (communal knowledge or common knowledge) and 
finesse d'esprit (astuteness).  For Duhem, success in science requires a balance between what he 
calls the "geometrical" mind working within a symbolic system and the mind of "common sense" 
understood in these three ways.   
 With these three elements in place, we are now in a position to bring them to bear on 
further developing a philosophical account of scientific types.  I want to argue that scientific 
systems of typification, such as the examples from biology, geology, and metrology discussed 
here, are symbolic systems in Duhem's sense.  Moreover, they are symbolic systems that are at 
the intersection of (a conventionally stipulated) nomenclature and (efforts towards a "natural 
classification") taxonomy.  Scientific types, as we have seen, are designed to fix the reference of 
the names they bear: 'T.s. infernalis' refers to whatever species the T.s. infernalis type specimen 
belongs to, and 'one kilogram' refers to whatever mass the IPK possesses.  As such, these objects 
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serve as the "symbolic" standard of reference for their kind, and hence are taken by convention to 
be infallible in belonging to the kind they name or define.   
 However, as we have seen in the three examples of scientific types discussed here, there  
are independent standards for judging which taxons these scientific types belong to.  Following 
Duhem we can refer to these broadly as the "common sense" or "communal knowledge" 
standards.  In the case of prototypes, the independent (non-symbolic) standard by which to judge 
whether the mass of the IPK was exactly 1. 00 kg was, first, the common sense background 
knowledge that all concrete physical objects take up contamination from their environment and 
lose mass through cleaning; and second, the "communal knowledge" of the IPK's stability 
through intercomparison projects (coherence testing) with other kilogram standards both at the 
BIPM and around the world.  Although perhaps underdetermined as to where the error lies, a 
finesse d'esprit guided the metrologists in the decision to locate the error in the scientific type 
and initiate the process of redefinition.  In the case of holotypes, we saw the independent (non-
symbolic) standard in the ICZN's deference to "taxonomic accord with prevailing usage"—a kind 
of "communal knowledge" independent standard—which can judge a type specimen not to 
belong the species it names.  Similarly, a stratotype definition of the base of a 
chronostratigraphic unit, such as the Silurian, can be judged by the independent standard of 
enabling a stability and coherence of practice in stratigraphic correlation, which is its aim.  In all 
three cases, a detailed examination of scientific practice shows that the supposed infallibility or 
absolute accuracy of types in belonging to the taxon that they name is a myth.  Scientific types 
are also judged by independent, common sense or communal knowledge standards.   
 In thinking about the scientific practice of typification, it is helpful to keep in mind not 
just the structure of this symbolic system, but also its aim.  The aim of scientific typification, 
recall, is to secure a stability and coherence of nomenclature and practice in the face of ever-
evolving scientific knowledge.  Scientists usually cede a priority of accuracy in nomenclature 
and definitions to the international organizations governing these systems of typification, and 
choose to locate any errors, not in these type standards, but in their particular taxonomic or 
measurement practices.  They do so because this is typically the best way to secure a stability 
and coherence of scientific nomenclature and practice.  However, scientists do not cede common 
sense, and when scientific types falter in their ability to secure a stability and coherence of 
practice, that external coherence itself becomes an independent standard by which to judge the 
accuracy and adequacy of the type.  When this happens, scientists can choose to locate the errors 
in the scientific types and revise them accordingly; indeed all systems of typification have 
clauses allowing for such an option in exceptional circumstances, as we have seen.  In the end it 
is nomenclature that serves taxonomy, not the reverse.   
 Although types can perform a variety of discipline-specific functions, they share a 
common focal function, which I have here used as a basis for constructing the first general 
definition of a scientific type.  In addition to providing this definition, I have outlined a novel 
Duhemian philosophy of scientific types and demonstrated the fertility of this framework for a 
number of debates: the necessity-contingency debate in biology, the absolute accuracy of 
standards debate in metrology, and the definition-correlation debate in geology.  There are other 
important philosophical debates about types to explore within each of these subfields, such as the 
ethical debate in biology about whether type specimens should be collected for vulnerable 
species (Havstad 2019).  By offering a general definition and theory of types, I hope to provide a 
foundation for further philosophical work in this area.  Just as there has been a productive 
synergy between philosophical accounts of natural kinds and scientific taxonomic practices, so 
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too there is much to be gained from developing a deeper understanding of the practices and 
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